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Abstract. Globalization of present world economy has not only an 
economic component but also an important juridical aspect. Many 
countries are concerned to review or to supplement their internal 
legislation in order to make it compatible with legal rules that already 
exist in other countries or geographical zones that, usually, have an 
important role within their economic exchanges. China represents such 
an example, a country that, in the last decades, has intensified its 
commercial exchanges with EU member states. This trend was 
encouraged by the adoption of the Law Anti-Monopoly in China. 
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Globalization of present world economy has not only an economic 
component but also an important juridical aspect. The globalization process 
impacts both the world economic flow and the implementation of unitary 
regulations or at least of a harmonized regulatory framework that can sustain 
the more and more complex economic relationships between the enterprises 
from different countries. Therefore, more and more countries are concerned to 
review or to amend their internal legislation in order to make it compatible with 
legal rules that already exist in other countries or geographical zones that, 
usually, have an important role within their economic exchanges.  
China represents such an example, a country that, in the last decades, has 
intensified its commercial exchanges with EU member states, as traditional 
partners within China exchanges. 
Moreover, after Chine became in 2001 a member of the World Trade 
Organization, its opening to foreign investments increased significantly
(1).  
In this context, China Anti-Monopoly Law finds its reason of being
(2). As 
we will see, this law has been conceived and based on almost identical 
principles to the Community right provisions on competition. The law provides, 
within the Chinese market, action and control mechanisms similar to those 
regulated by the European treaties, such as: interdiction of the concerted 
practices
(3), interdiction of dominant position abuse
(4), mergers and concen-
trations control (Foster, 2007, p. 161). This similarity emerges, as shown 
herein
(5), in the successful economic cooperation between the European Union 
and China. 
 
1. The bilateral economic cooperation EU-China  
 
The continuous development within the last decades of the commercial 
exchanges between EU and China permitted the adoption, on the 2003 Summit, 
of a joint declaration which identified the competition policies as a major 
interest zone for the two parties. Then, starting 2003, a series of inter-
institutional exchanges
(6) took place between EU and China, mainly aimed at 
sharing to Chinese partners the expertise and success of European authorities in 
competition field. The consultations and EU recommendations to China 
consisted in: setting up clear objectives in China for the competition law and its 
application regime, establishment of strong and independent state institutions 
for the control of competition practices and to secure its procedural equity and 
transparency in approaching competition aspects. In the same line, in 2004 a 
Dialogue of Competition Policies was opened between Europe and China 
(www.europa.eu), as a permanent forum of consultation and transparency. Until 
LAM adoption in 2007, this dialogue pursuit mainly issues related to antitrust, Law Antimonopoly of China – a Model of European Inspiration 
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meaning cross border mergers, public utilities liberalization and state intrusion 
in market processes, multilateral competition. Official visits, high level idea 
exchange and consultations between EU representatives (the Director of 
International Relationships Division of the European Commission or the 
European Commissary for Competition) and Chinese officials have constituted 
a real push and support for the adoption of the Anti-monopoly Law in China
(3). 
Received with encouragement by European officials, the new Chinese 
law is based on certain key concepts of the European competition law. The 
goals of this law, as mentioned by article 1, are: to prevent monopolist 
commercial behaviors, to protect a fair competition on the market and to 
strengthen its economic efficiency in order to safeguard consumer’s interests 
and the public interest. Thus, article 3 of the law defines as monopolist 
behaviors incompatible to a normal competition climate, the following: 
agreements of monopoly type between market operators, abuses of dominant 
position; economic cluster which eliminate or affect competition, or might 
eliminate or affect competition on the relevant market). Also, article 4 of the 
law provides that all economic activities in China may be performed only 
within the state control and in accordance with the principles of socialist market 
policies: macro-control and a unified, opened and competitive market system.  
Therefore, the anti-monopoly practices are controlled by three State agencies: 
the Trade Ministry (for the mergers control), the National Commission for 
Development and Reform (for the price related monopolist policies) and the 
State Administration for Industry and Trade (for agreement between 
undertakings and dominant position abuse which are not related to price 
settlement on the market).  
    
2. Interdiction of agreements of concerted practices  
 
European Commission regards these practices as ones of the most serious 
violations of the competition right. The practice shows, at least, at a statistic 
level, that the majority fields in which such concerted practices occur are: 
setting up prices on a relevant market, geographical allocation of clients among 
certain companies, or setting up and limitation of production volumes. Based on 
these grounds, article 101 TFEU
(7), ex-article 81 TCE
(8) defines these concerted 
practices and the limits within which they are acting
(9).  
At European level, the Commission and the competition authorities of the 
Member States benefit of a series of competences to prevent such anti-
competition behaviors, including:  fiscal facilities or fiscal reductions for the 
companies offering information about such anti-competition practices; 
inspection and control competences; the competence to consistently request Cornelia Lefter, Oana Oprea (Teodorescu) 
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documents and information from the active companies by activity sectors. For 
instance, in November 2008, the Commission sanctioned
(4) the enterprises 
Asahi, Pilkington, Saint-Gobain, S Oliver, in the autovehicles glasses field, 
imposing the payment of about EUR 1.3 billion as sanction on the participants 
to such an understanding put into practice with the violation of Art. 101 TCE.  
The involved parties were found guilty of an illegal sharing of the market and 
of exchanges of sensitive commercial information about the product deliveries 
on the relevant market.  
As for LAM, these concerted practices or understandings are known as 
monopoly agreements and are divided as follows:  
  horizontal monopoly agreements, which, in general, are the equivalent 
of the concerted practices at European Union level. They relate to 
agreements between companies aimed at setting up product prices, at 
limiting production volume and products supply, at sharing the 
dominant market among them and at restricting research-development 
activities on the relevant market or even at boycotting certain 
suppliers, competitors or even clients.  
  vertical monopoly agreements, regarding the understandings between a 
company and its commercial partners aimed at setting up reselling 
prices or to restrict the minimum reselling prices to third parties.  
Similar to the European regulations, the articles 53 and 54 of LAM 
provides a system of facilities and fiscal reductions, or even for the exemption 
from sanctions application on the companies involved in such a monopoly 
agreement, but which offered conclusive information and report these 
prohibited agreements to the competent state authorities. As for their powers, 
the competent authorities to apply anti-monopoly practices have the following 
assignments: inspections on the company’s premises; requests of information 
and documents from the involved companies; requests of bank account 
statements of the companies and requests of information regarding their 
relations with banking authorities; sealing and retaining the proofs found out; 
request of relevant documents belonging to the companies, interested parties or 
even to other relevant entities, or individuals.  
 
3. Interdiction of dominant position abuse 
 
According to the European competition law, a company is in a dominant 
position if its economic power is allowing it to act independently from its 
competitors and eventually, to its clients (Foster, 2007, p. 161).  The dominant 
position abuse is defined by article 102 TFEU (ex-article 82 TCE)
 (10).  Law Antimonopoly of China – a Model of European Inspiration 
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One of the best known cases in this field is that of the European Commission 
against Microsoft (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/microsoft). 
On this case, the European Commission intervened based on the complaint of 
Sun Microsystems and after an assessment decided in March 2004 that 
Microsoft abused of its dominant position on the market of PC operation 
systems. Consequentially, Microsoft was forced to pay a fine of EUR 497 
million for abusing its dominant position on the market of PC operation systems 
and to disclose the information allowing its competitors to operate and become 
compatible with Windows. 
LAM defines the abuse of dominant position as a market position of a 
company which can: either control the prices or quantity of products, or any 
other conditions of the transactions on the relevant market; or to block and 
affect the access of other companies to the relevant market.  
The abusive and thus prohibited practices include: product sales at 
excessive and unjustified prices; product purchases at unjustified low prices; 
unjustified refuse to enter commercial relations with certain companies; product 
sales at damping prices, also without justification.  
In this case, the anti-monopoly authorities have, like EU rules, the 
discretionary power to establish if the companies have or not a dominant 
position and if these companies are submitted to a special responsibility (such 
as that of not abusing their dominant position, so that not to affect or restrict 
effective competition). 
 
4. Control of company’s  mergers and takeovers  
 
In the field of company’s mergers and takeovers control, EU has a system 
of previous notifications and there is actually a jurisdiction divided between the 
Commission and the Member State authorities entitled to apply competition 
policies.  
The mergers of a certain level, with major impact on European and even 
world economy, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of European Commission. 
Such a transaction has to be notified to the Commission, which has about 35 
days to clarify its terms and conditions and to make certain recommendations. 
Only after this period and if the respective mergers prove they do not affect real 
competition, the Commission starts the actual case analysis. To this end, the 
Commission has 125 working days to decide about the banning of the 
transaction or its permission, considering its compliance with competition 
practices. Usually, the clarification of transaction terms is done during the first 
phase and the Commission shall not authorize a merger if, its justified Cornelia Lefter, Oana Oprea (Teodorescu) 
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conclusion is that the respective merger has a negative effect on the competition 
balance (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/overview_en.html).  
If the merger has a major significant impact over the intra-community 
competition, the assessment and decision authority belongs to the Member 
States’ authorities. They can make market analyses and surveys and can impose 
the terms of a merger, in order to ensure an effective competition, or can even 
forbid the whole process per se.  
LAM provides for a pre-notification system of mergers falling within 
certain value thresholds. In a similar way to EU provisions, the thresholds are 
set up depending on the respective companies’ income. The Decree regarding 
the Declaration of Thresholds for Economic Clusters was published on August 
3rd, 2008, while the China State Council has been empowered to adopt 
application norms in specific fields such as banks, insurances, goods etc.  
Worth mentioning is also that the economic clusters of foreign investing 
companies in China will be pre-notified in China once they reach the thresholds 
set up by the above mentioned legislation. The Ministry of Commerce of China 
can impose specific conditions in this sense, as it happened in the previously 
mentioned case Anheuser Busch/InBev
(11).  
The standards and thresholds which make such a pre-notification 
necessary are calculated according to the annual income of the companies 
involved in the clustering, the same as in EU. In addition to the Community 
provisions, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce can intervene in the 
concentrations which do not meet the pre-notification thresholds established if 
it has justifications to consider the respective concentration might affect 
competition on the relevant market. The conclusion is that, like in EU, where 
the previous notifications are actually a competition test, the same is happening 
in China, but the Ministry of Commerce can justify a transaction not necessarily 
by the thresholds reached, but due to other reasons, such as the public interest. 
The Ministry of Commerce has in this way a discretionary power whose 
application should, on our opinion, make the object of new regulations, also 
aimed at eliminating abuses on the relevant markets.  
Even if, unlike European competition policies, the Chinese ones are in an 
incipient stage, there is, as mentioned before herein, a significant convergence 
between the two policy types, both at concept and application level.  
Moreover, the fact that the principles and methods of their application are 
so similar, and sometimes identical, shows once more a successful export of 
commercial policies of EU, which makes nothing else but strengthens its role of 
major player on the world economic market. 
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Notes 
 
 (1)  European investments on Chinese market exceed EUR 35 billion, most of them after 2001.  
(2)  The Anti-monopoly Law or LAM was adopted in August 2007 and entered into force on the 
1
st of August 2008. 
 (3)  According to Competition, The Law and Leading Lawyers Worldwide, vol. I, Practical Law 
Company, PLC Cross Border Handbooks, Legal and Commercial Publishing Ltd., 2009, p. 39  
(4)  Jurnalul Oficial C173, 25/07/2009, pp. 13-16 
(5)  www.europa.eu/competition/international/bilateral 
 (6)  Between the European Commission and the Trade Ministry of China.  
(7)  Treaty for the functioning of the European Union. 
(8)  European Community Treaty. 
(9)  Article 101 TFEU provides that: 
(1) Any agreements between companies are incompatible with the domestic market and 
banned, as well as any decisions of companies’ association and any concerted practices 
which might affect the trade between the Member States and which have as object or effect 
the hindering, narrowing or distortion of competition within the Common Market and 
especially those which:   
  (a) set up, directly or indirectly, buying or selling prices, or any other trading conditions;  
  (b) limit or control production, trading, technical development or investments;  
  (c) divide the markets or supplying sources;  
  (d) apply, in the relations with commercial partners, unequal conditions for equivalent 
services, generating in this way a competition disadvantage;  
  (e) condition the contracts signing by the partners’ acceptance of additional services, which, 
by their nature, or according to commercial customs, have no connection to the object of the 
respective contracts;  
  (2) Agreements or decisions banned based on the present article are rightfully null.  
  (3) Nevertheless, the provisions of paragraph  (1) can be declared as inapplicable in case of: 
- any agreements or categories of agreements between companies; 
- any decisions or categories of decisions of companies’ association;  
- any concerted practices or categories of concerted practices  
  which contribute to the improvement of production or products distribution, or to the 
promotion of technical or economic progress, also securing the consumers an equitable part 
of the obtained benefit and which:  
  (a) do not impose on the respective companies constraints which are not indispensable for 
the meeting of those objectives;  
  (b) do not offer the companies the chance to eliminate competition as regards a significant 
part of the respective products. 
(10) Article 102 (former article 82 TCE) provides that: 
  It is incompatible with the domestic market and banned, to the extent in which it can affect 
the trade between the Member States, the abuse use by one or several companies of a 
dominating position gained on the domestic market, or on a significant part of it.  
  These abusive practices may consist especially of: 
(a) imposing, directly or indirectly, buying or selling prices, or any other inequitable trading 
conditions; Cornelia Lefter, Oana Oprea (Teodorescu) 
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  (b) limit or control production, trading, technical development to the consumers’ 
disadvantage;  
  (c) apply, in the relations with commercial partners, unequal conditions for equivalent 
services, generating in this way a competition  disadvantage; 
  (d) condition the contracts signing by the partners’ acceptance of additional services, which, 
by their nature, or according to commercial customs, have no connection to the object of the 
respective contracts.   
(11) Anheuser Busch/InBev is the first case where the Chinese Trade Minister published in 2008 
a decision in the area of mergers. This case deals with the undertaking of Anheuser Busch 
by InBev. The Trade Minister stated that the respective undertaking  would not affect the 
relevant market (the beer producers market in China), but imposed some disputed conditions 
limiting InBev to acquire interest parts in other companies on the relevant market. Thus, 
InBev was forbidden: to acquire interest parts in two Chinese beer producers – Resources 
Snow and Beijing Yanjing, to increase the ownership of Anheuser-Busch in another beer 
producer (Tsing-Tao Brewery) and to increase InBev ownership in another beer producer, 
Zhujiang Brewery. These restrictions imposed on the future transactions surprised the 
experts  as a competition authority would not normally impose conditions for a future 
undertaking, but only to the effects of such a concentration on the market. In other words, a 
competition authority would not normally state unfavorably with respect to a future 
concentration, unless the respective concentration would negatively impact competition on 
the relevant market. 
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